https://taxonomy.eticas.ai/risk/security-misuse
Maturity: established
The risk that an AI system is exposed to AI-specific vulnerabilities, attacks, or misuse that compromise its integrity, availability, or confidentiality. This covers risks beyond traditional IT security, including adversarial inputs, prompt injection, model extraction, jailbreaking, and supply-chain risks specific to AI components. It is intended to complement, not replace, standard IT security assessments.
Also known as: Safety, Security & Misuse · Security · Safety
System type: ADM and LLM systems
Lifecycle stages: Pre Processing, In Processing, Post Processing
Status. Each mapping shows what it rests on. Reviewed means a reviewer has confirmed the mapping against the concept’s current definition and the framework edition the taxonomy currently references; when the only confirmation is that of the person who wrote the mapping, it reads Reviewed (author’s confirmation). Outdated means it was reviewed, but the concept’s definition has changed since, so the review has to be repeated. The other statuses mean that no review has been recorded yet. Inherited mappings have been in the taxonomy since before v5.7.0 and are unchanged. They carry no record of who made them or how, and some were checked by hand when the taxonomy first published its mappings. Agent-proposed mappings come from a review carried out by AI agents, which read the framework’s text and the concept’s definition and agreed on the relation; no person has confirmed them yet. Provisional mappings were made without access to the framework’s text. Unreviewed mappings are older mappings whose target or relation was revised in v5.7.0, and any other mapping without a review. Mappings to a superseded edition of a framework are not shown: where the provision continues, they are carried to the current edition. Mappings a review has changed or rejected are not shown.
| Framework | Reference | Status |
|---|---|---|
| EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689) | Article 15(5) — resilience against attempts by unauthorized third parties to alter use, outputs or performance | Inherited |
| AIUC-1 — AI Underwriting Company Standard | Security domain | Inherited |
| Council of Europe Framework Convention on AI (CETS No. 225) | Article 12 — Reliability | Unreviewed |
| NIST AI Risk Management Framework (AI 100-1) | Secure and Resilient | Inherited |
| NIST AI 600-1 — Generative AI Risk Profile | Information Security | Inherited |
| OECD AI Principles | 1.4 Robustness, security and safety | Inherited |
| TC260 AI Safety Governance Framework (v2.0) | §3.1.1(e) External adversarial attack | Agent-proposed |
| Framework | Reference | Status |
|---|---|---|
| MIT AI Risk Repository | AI system security vulnerabilities and attacks | Inherited |
| MIT AI Risk Repository | Malicious Actors | Inherited |
| AIR 2024 | Security Risks | Agent-proposed |
| W3C Data Privacy Vocabulary — AI Extension | Security Attack | Agent-proposed |